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Abstract 
Incorporating environmental public interest litigation (EPIL) is an important 
development in the evolving framework of environmental governance in China. 
Through quantitative and qualitative analyses of decided cases brought by local 
government, public prosecutors and environmental NGOs, this study critically 
examines the features, strengths, difficulties and obstacles in the EPIL practice of China. 
While there is remarkable success overall for all three groups in terms of outcome, they 
each display different approaches and focuses. The prosecutors have established 
themselves as the cornerstone of the system by being the most efficient in winning the 
greatest number of cases. NGOs moved away from collaboration with the prosecutors 
in low-value cases, effectively into a competition with the government in a smaller 
number of high-value cases. Though they are willing to venture into areas where others 
hesitate over. The findings offer valuable insight to current EPIL practice and inform 
future policy adjustment and legislation. 
Keywords: Chinese law, public interest litigation, environmental litigation, 
environmental NGO, public prosecutor, local government 
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In the past decades, the Chinese environmental framework has evolved dramatically 
into a comprehensive legal system incorporating a total of approximately 30 laws and 
130 regulations, representing Chinese government’s commitment to relying on law 
enforcement in environmental governance. 1  An area of notable changes is the 
incorporation of the public in environmental policy process,2 including via information 
disclosure and participation in environmental impact assessment.3 Commentors have 
nevertheless critiqued the weak enforcement of these legal requirements and the 
insignificance of such involvement, 4 noting that the root cause lies in the ambiguous 
legal texts.5 
The institutionalization of Environmental Public Interest Litigation (EPIL hereinafter) 
represents an important development in China’s legal and political reform, where 
involving the citizens serves to improve China’s environmental performance that 
heavily relied on regulatory policy instrument. These contemporary reforms also 
strengthens the Party’s rule with an impression of improving the rule of law.6 The 
burgeoning environmental movement, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in 
 
1 Zheng Shaohua and Wang Hui, ‘中国环境法制四十年：法律文本、法律实施与未来走向 <Forty Years of 
Environmental Rule of Law in China>’ (2018) 11 Law Science 17-29 
2 Lei Zhang, Guizhen He, and Arthur PJ Mol, ‘China’s new Environmental Protection Law: a game changer?’ (2015) 
13 Environmental Development 1-3 
3 Guizhen He, Yonglong Lu and Arthur PJ Mol, ‘Changes and challenges: China's environmental management in 
transition’ (2012) 3 Environmental Development 25-38 
4 Xiao Zhao and Kaijie Wu, ‘Public Participation in China’s Environmental Lawmaking: In Pursuit of Better 
Environmental Democracy’, (2017) 29(3) Journal of Environmental Law 389-416 
5 Ran Ran ‘Perverse incentive structure and policy implementation gap in China's local environmental politics’ 
(2013) 15(1) Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning 17-39 
6 Qianfang Zhang, ‘The Communist Party Leadership and Rule of Law: A Tale of Two Reforms’ (2020) 30 (130) 
Journal of Contemporary China 578-595 https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2020.1852743 
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China are keen to adopt a legal approach to affect environmental policy.7 This is 
regarded by NGOs as an effective route to influence environmental policy, such as 
supervising government policy process8 as well as industrial polluters’ performance,9 
but with less potential risks than advocacy activities that may endanger their status.10 
Concurrently, the central powers in China have authorized and instructed both local 
government and the People’s Procuratorate, China’s public prosecutors, to join in EPIL 
actions, using litigation as important enforcement measures. The Chinese court now 
hear and decide over two thousand EPIL cases every year, offering a crucial forum for 
the discussion and examination of China’s evolving environmental governance and 
practice. 
In examining the system of EPIL, existing scholarship tends to focus either on the 
rigorous description of the legal regimes that enabled the quick growth of EPIL in 
recent years or the doctrinal questioning of the implications and ideologies of public 
interest litigation in the particular legal and political system of China.11 EPIL is seen 
as an experiment by the Chinese state, with many questions over the integrity of the 
judicial system12 and doubting whether such practice would lead to meaningful public 
 
7 Xiangyi Ren and Lili Liu, ‘Building Consensus: Support Structure and the Frames of Environmental Legal 
Mobilization in China’ (2019) 29(121) Journal of Contemporary China 109-124 
8 Rachel E Stern, ‘From Dispute to Decision: Suing Polluters in China’ (2011) The China Quarterly 294-312 
9 Benjamin van Rooij, ‘The People vs. Pollution: Understanding Citizen Action against Pollution in China’ (201) 
19(63) The Journal of Contemporary China 55-77 
10 May Farid and Hui Li, ‘Reciprocal Engagement and NGO Policy Influence on the Local State in China’, (2020) 
Voluntas, doi:10.1007/s11266-020-00288-5 
11 Mingde Cao and Fengyuan Wang, ‘Environmental Public Interest Litigation in China’, (2011) 19(2) Asia Pacific 
Law Review 217-235; Richard Zhang and Mayer Benoit, ‘Public interest environmental litigation in China’ (2017) 
1(2) Chinese Journal of Environmental Law 1(2) 202-228 
12  Daniel Carpenter-Gold, ‘Castles Made of Sand: Public-Interest Litigation and China’s New Environmental 
Protection Law’ (2015) 39 Harvard Environmental Law Review 241; Stern (n 8).  
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participation,13 typically with the sample base of a small number of representative 
cases.14 There is arguably a widening gap between what is happening in thousands of 
EPIL cases in China and what is depicted and examined in the literature. 
This present study aims to start bridging such a gap, by undertaking quantitative and 
qualitative analyses of over 800 EPIL cases, including 570 final judgments and 
decisions. It seeks to answer the following questions. How successful are the 
procuratorate, local government and NGOs as claimants in EPIL in terms of outcome 
of litigation and recovery of compensation and costs? What are the differences in focus 
and approach for the different groups and how such differences contribute to their main 
achievements and difficulties in EPIL? What are the potential implications for EPIL 
policies and strategies of the different groups based on the successes and obstacles 
encountered in practice? 
This article is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the context and overview of 
the legal framework for EPIL in China. Section 3 explains the methodology of this study, 
especially the choice of cases in the study and the constraints. Section 4 presents the 
key quantitative findings in data, tables and diagrams, before Section 5 substantively 
analyses the underlying issues and implications of such findings. Section 6 makes a 
number of suggestions as to how NGOs, the procuratorate and the government could 
adjust their strategies and priorities in EPIL, as well as the possible realignment of the 
legal framework based on the existing practice. The article concludes in Section 7. 
 
13 Jingjing Liu, ‘China’s Procuratorate in Environmental Civil Enforcement: Practice, Challenges and Implications 
for China’s Environmental Governance’ (2011) 13 Vermont Journal of Environmental Law 41-63; Jingjing Liu, 
‘Environmental Justice with Chinese Characteristics: Recent Developments in Using Environmental Public Interest 
Litigation to Strengthen Access to Environmental Justice’ (2012) 7(2) Florida A&M University Law Review 229 
14 Scott Wilson, ‘Environmental participation in the shadow of the Chinese state’ (2016) 4(3) Economic and 
Political Studies 211-237. 
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2. Context and overview of EPIL framework  
2.1 China’s legal and political environment for EPIL and NGOs 
Scholarship has noticed that governmental willingness is a key factor impacting the 
implementation of legal regulation that relates to involving the public. On the one hand, 
local government units in China have been found not only to not specifically implement 
public engagement,15 but also to be selective in information disclosure to the extent of 
strategic ‘information manipulation’.16 On the other hand, the traditional model of the 
local government acting only as the regulator, issuing administrative penalties when 
environmental damage occurs, is also seen as a flawed approach of environmental 
protection, where the remedial work often ended up as ‘polluted by the enterprise, paid 
for by the government’.17 EPIL and the legal approach more generally could represent 
an effective and low-risk compromise for Chinese government in balancing the 
complex needs of allowing public engagement and protecting the environment. 
In addition, it is worth noting that a pronounced feature of the Chinese judicial system 
is that it does not function independently. Explicitly under the leadership of the 
Communist Party, local courts are largely embedded within the local governments and 
are often dependent on the government.18 Other legal obstacles include the difficulty 
in proving acts of pollution, causation and evidence of damage, as well as procedural 
 
15 Xiao Zhu, Lei Zhang, Ran Ran and PJ Mol Arthur, ‘Regional restrictions on environmental impact assessment 
approval in China: the legitimacy of environmental authoritarianism’ (2015) 92 Journal of Cleaner Production 100-
108; Xiaoliang Li, Xiaojin Yang, Qi Wei and Bing Zhang, ‘Authoritarian environmentalism and environmental 
policy implementation in China’ (2019) 145 Resources, Conservation & Recycling 86-93 
16 Alex L Wang, ‘Explaining environmental information disclosure in China’ (2018) 44 Ecology Law Quarterly 865, 
911-913. 
17 Weiyu Wu, ‘The Reform of the Compensation System for Ecological and Environmental Damage in China’ (2020) 
60 Natural Resources Journal 63-102, 72. 
18 Ren and Liu (n 7); Stern (n 8). 
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limitations.19 Following this line of analysis, commentors have questioned whether the 
promulgation of EPIL challenges local government’s autonomy in environmental 
governance, or whether the Chinese judicial system has constrained NGOs to function 
independently in EPIL.20 Several studies have examined the features of the practices 
of EPIL in China, suggesting that NGOs have played limited roles in the field, judged 
by the slow growth of number of EPIL cases brought by NGOs.21 
Chinese NGOs have increasingly adopted legal practices when impacting 
environmental governance. Compared with direct actions or protests for their advocacy, 
NGOs have shown interest to engage with a legal approach as part of their advocacy 
activities, with the intention to avoid confrontation with government.22 A gradual shift 
can be seen in NGOs clearly adopting legal mobilization as a distinctive goal to support 
their cause. Past experiences indicate that NGOs with legal expertise, when conducting 
advocacy, had merely aimed to raise the public’s awareness of their environmental 
rights and possibly pursue selected cases to defend their interests. In comparison, EPIL 
has provided NGOs with more legal space to engage in China’s environmental 
governance, with the possibility to challenge political authorities in the name of 
defending public interests. However, existing scholarship informs us that NGOs have 
shown weaknesses in acting as a professional force in litigation practices. They have 
displayed difficulties in financial resources to meet litigation costs23 as well as a lack 
 
19 van Rooij (n 9) 68-69. 
20 Wilson (n 14) 
21 Dan Guttman et al, ‘Environmental governance in China: Interactions Between the State and NonState actors’ 
(2018) 220 Journal of Environmental Management 126-135; Scott Wilson, ‘Environmental participation in the 
shadow of the Chinese state’ (2016) 4(3) Economic and Political Studies 211-237 
22 van Rooij (n 9) 
23 CBCGDF (China Biodiversity Conservation and Green Development Foundation) Look Back on the Changzhou 
Environment Public Interest Case, (2017), https://cbcgdf.wordpress.com/2017/02/07/look-back-on-the-
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of legal expertise. 24  The considerable legal involvement of environmental NGOs 
brings about further changes to the fabrics and relationships in the Chinese legal and 
political system, where local government, the judiciary and the public prosecutors all 
had to adapt to and accommodate such development.  
 
2.2 Overview of EPIL framework 
EPIL is a relatively new, narrow and clearly demarcated area within the broad realm of 
environmental law and litigation in China. Generally speaking, parties who suffered 
loss as a result of pollution or other environmental and ecological harm have been 
pursuing their claims under the general law of tort for decades.25 That part of the 
general law is now consolidated by the Civil Code that came into force on 1 January 
2021, which also allows punitive damages for the first time in serious cases of deliberate 
pollution or ecological damage.26  On the other hand, EPIL concerns litigation by 
claimants, who have not suffered loss themselves, claiming compensation and other 
remedies in the name of ‘public interest’ (gongyi). EPIL only really become practicable 
from 2014 with the amendments to the Environmental Protection Law.27 As things 
stand, only three groups are allowed to bring EPIL, namely environmental NGOs, the 
 
changzhouenvironmental-pubic-interest-litigation-case/; Chun Zhang and Damin Tang, ‘Changzhou Soil Pollution 
Case is Far from over’, China Dialogue, (2017), https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/9630-The-
Changzhou-soil-pollution-case-is-far-from-over/；Guttman (n 21) 
24 Qi Gao, ‘Public Interest Litigation in China: Panacea or Placebo for Environmental Protection?’ (2018) 16(4) 
China: an international journal 47- 75 
25 Environmental Protection Law of PRC, first enacted in 1989, had specific provisions on litigation to claim 
compensation for environmental pollution in Articles 41 and 42. 
26 Civil Code of PRC, Art.1232 
27 The 2012 amendments to the Civil Procedure Law (Art.55) provided that authorities and relevant organizations 




procuratorate, and local government. 
Civil EPIL may be brought by qualified NGOs since 2014. These NGO must register 
with the authorities, have environmental protection as their main objectives, and are 
clear of any unlawful activities or rule-breaking in the previous five years.28 In civil 
EPIL, NGOs may ask the court for a wide range of remedies against the defendant 
responsible for environmental or ecological harm, such as ending relevant behaviours 
or activities harmful to the environment, taking remedial actions, paying compensation 
for environmental damage including the loss of service function during the period of 
harm prior to full recovery, reimbursing expenditures and costs in clearing up pollution 
or remedying the damage to the environment, and public apology by the defendant.29 
NGOs may also recover reasonable costs they have incurred in pursuing EPIL, 
including costs of forensic analysis and lawyers’ fees. 
Civil EPIL by the procuratorate started in 2015 with a pilot implementation in 
thirteen provinces and became national in 2017. Where the procuratorate discovers 
incidents of environmental damage, it should make the effort to ask either relevant 
authorities (i.e. governmental departments) or qualified organizations (i.e. NGOs) to 
come forward and bring civil EPIL. In cases where no such authority or organization is 
ready to take on the civil EPIL, the procuratorate may then initiate civil EPIL itself 
instead.30 A similar set of remedies is available in procuratorial EPIL as those by NGOs. 
In addition to civil EPIL, the procuratorate may also bring forward administrative EPIL 
 
28 Environmental Protection Law of PRC, Art.58. 
29 Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues concerning the Application of Law in the Trial of 
Environmental Civil Public Interest Litigations, Art.18-21. 
30 Civil Procedure Law of PRC, Art.55. 
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against local government or governmental departments for not fulfilling their duties of 
environmental protection.31 The court may find the government to be in breach of their 
duties and order timely performance of the duties. There is no scope for compensation 
or any financial concerns in administrative EPIL by the procuratorate against the 
government. 
Lastly, EPIL by the government remains the least formalized procedure out of these 
three groups of claimants. Although local government has initiated and won several 
cases of EPIL in the past, the effort of institutionalizing the procedure only started in 
2016 with the Ecological Environmental Damage Compensation (EEDC hereinafter) 
system piloted in seven provinces, which went national in 2018. Although there is 
suggestion that EEDC could be classified as state interest litigation rather than public 
interest litigation, such distinction is not widely supported.32 In essence, EEDC is 
broadly comparable to civil EPIL brought by NGOs and the procuratorate, albeit with 
some procedural differences such as the pre-litigation requirement for the local 
government to attempt negotiation with the prospective defendant. More importantly, 
the practical rules of EEDC are still based on policy documents from the central 
government instead of any law enacted by the National People’s Congress.33 There are 
 
31 Administrative Procedure Law of PRC, Art.25. 
32  Hao Li, ‘生态损害赔偿诉讼的本质及相关问题研究  <A Study on the Essence of Ecological Damage 
Compensation Lawsuit and Related Issues>’ (2019/4) Administrative Law Review 55-66, at 58-60; Xinqi Liu, ‘我国
公益诉讼制度的逻辑梳理与修正 <The logic and adjustment of the public interest litigation system in China>’ 
(2020/3) The Chinese Procurators 56-59, 57. 
33 Articles 1234 & 1235 of the Civil Code provide that authorities as designated by the State or organizations 
regulated by law could demand remedy of and compensation for ecological environmental damage, without 
specifying details such as which authorities have such powers or the procedures they must follow for EEDC. Thus 
the basis of EEDC litigation practice is still rooted in the Reform Plan of the Ecological Environmental Damage 
Compensation System (2017, available on the State Council website: http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2017-
12/17/content_5247952.htm) and 2019 provisions from the Supreme People’s Court. For the basis of EEDC practice, 
see Lei Xie and Lu Xu, ‘Environmental Public Interest Litigation in China: a critical examination’ (2021) 
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questions marks over many practical details in EEDC procedure such as authorization 
for initiating EEDC cases by different levels of government, to be examined below. 
 
Table 1 Number of court resolved EPIL cases 2015-19 
 NGOs Procuratorate Government EEDC 
2015 53 34 6 35 N/A 
2016 68 34 77 36 Very few 
2017 58 37 1,304 37 Very few38 
2018 65 37 1,737 37 8 39 
2019 5839 1,895 39 36 39 
 
Table 1 presents the number of EPIL cases dealt with by the court by the different 
claimants between 2015 and 2019. Despite minor discrepancies in the exact figures 
 
Transnational Environmental Law (FirstView) 1-25, doi:10.1017/S2047102520000448. 
34 Dun Li (ed), Review of Public Interest Litigation in Environment Protection 2016 (Law Press China, 2017) 1 
35 Ibid 311 & 316. 
36  Supreme People’s Court press conference on 7th March 2017, news report available in Chinese at 
https://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2017/03/id/2573898.shtml; Li (n 34) 311-325 would indicate that the 
number could be as high as 140. 
37  Supreme People’s Court press conference on 2nd March 2019, full script available in Chinese at 
https://www.chinacourt.org/chat/fulltext/listId/51171/template/courtfbh20190302.shtml.  
38 There were 30 resolved EEDC cases in total by May 2019. Supreme People’s Court press conference on 5th June 
2019, full script available in Chinese at http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-162292.html.  
39 Supreme People’s Court, ‘中国环境资源审判(2019 年) <Adjudgment of Environment and Resources Cases in 
China (2019)>’ (May 2020), available in Chinese at http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-228341.html. 
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from different sources, the overall picture is nevertheless consistent. NGOs have 50 to 
70 EPIL cases resolved in court each year, while the procuratorate have closer to 2,000 
cases. The number of EEDC cases brought by local government has risen sharply in 
2019 and is quickly catching up to NGO cases. 
3. Methodology  
This present study conducts qualitative and quantitative analyses of decided EPIL court 
cases initiated by NGOs, the procuratorate and local government. It examines these 
cases with regard to issues including the nature of any litigation, the environmental 
element concerned, outcome, monetary value, litigation costs and so on. The results of 
such examination provide insights on the involvement of different actors in 
environmental litigation, their preferences, strategies and limitations. 
For the avoidance of any selection bias in relation to information sources, this study 
only examines cases fully reported on China Judgements Online (CJO hereinafter), the 
official website run by the Supreme People’s Court for court judgments and related 
documents.40 As of January 2021, CJO houses over 114 million documents and has for 
a number of years claimed to be the world’s largest database of court judgments. This 
exclusion of any non-CJO sources could leave out cases, which are otherwise important, 
yet it should enhance the integrity of the study overall due to the clear threshold of 
eligibility to minimize bias due to information sources. 
Two important issues should be noted about CJO cases and any data generated 
thereon. Firstly, in this massive database, there is no consistently reliable mechanism 
 
40 http://wenshu.court.gov.cn.  
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for comprehensive identification of all cases in any branch of law or of any particular 
type. Although there are numerous searchable variables and filter options, the actual 
data entries, at the rate of typically more than 30,000 cases per day, are carried out by 
thousands of Chinese courts in real time, each likely having their own preferences and 
protocols in categorization or classification. Although functions such as full-text 
searches will mostly alleviate difficulties such as different categorization of cases by 
different courts, it is always possible that any study will overlook many cases for 
reasons such as typographical errors in the original documents or missing a viable 
combination of keywords by the researchers. 
Secondly, as massive as the CJO is and as quickly as it is still growing, it is not a 
complete database of all court judgments in China. Although the Supreme People’s 
Court has directed all courts in China that they should upload all judgments within 
seven days of issuance, unless there are reasons for not doing so such as concerns of 
national security, only a percentage of new cases are actually uploaded in the past few 
years.41 The status quo of CJO also means that even the most comprehensive study of 
cases therein will miss out on potentially important cases. 
Bearing in mind these two important caveats about the lack of comprehensiveness, 
this study used a combination of search and filter functions to pick up as many cases of 
EPIL as possible from the CJO database. With most of the searches conducted between 
June and August 2020, the initial effort gathered 881 judgments and related documents, 
using relevant keywords such as EPIL (huanjing gongyi susong), EEDC (shengtai 
 
41  Yang Jinjing, Qin Hui & He Haibo, ‘裁判文书上网的中国实践  <Chinese practice of publishing court 
judgments online>’ [2019/6] China Law Review 125-147, 128; Lu Xu, ‘The Changing Perspectives of Chinese Law: 
Socialist Rule of Law, Emerging Case Law and the Belt and Road Initiative’ (2019) 5 Chinese Journal of Global 
Governance 153-175, 169. 
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huanjing sunhai peichang), civil public interest lawsuit (minshi gongyi susong), 
administrative public interest lawsuit (xingzheng gongyi susong) and so on. These cases 
were then read and examined substantively, with irrelevant cases removed, procedural 
documents without enough substance discounted, and multiple documents in relation 
to the same case combined. Table 2 presents the final number of all EPIL cases that 
reached a final outcome examined in this study. 
 
Table 2 Number of cases with final outcome analysed in this study 
Claimants Types Number of Cases 
NGO civil EPIL 110 
Procuratorate civil EPIL 394 
administrative EPIL 21 
Government EEDC 28 
pre-EEDC or non-EEDC 17 
Total  570 
 
Collating the number of total EPIL cases known to have reached the court by 2019, 
it can be roughly estimated that the cases covered in this study would represent between 
a fifth to a quarter of all EPIL cases brought by NGOs, over 5% of cases by the 
procuratorate and perhaps half of the cases by the government. Though far from being 
comprehensive, the sample base in this study is nevertheless large enough to be 
14 
 
representative of the current EPIL practices in China. 
It is noted that the number of civil EPIL by the procuratorate includes 147 civil cases 
brought forward independently and 247 civil cases attached to another criminal 
prosecution (xingshi fudai minshi susong). After some effort of comparison, there is no 
discernible difference between these two groups of cases. The choice of whether to 
proceed with the civil case independently or to attach it to a criminal proceeding seems 
to be largely dependent on circumstances, such as whether there is a timely ongoing 
prosecution case. This group of 394 cases will therefore not be further distinguished 
below. 
It should be further noted that the number of NGO cases above excludes a series of 
cases in relation to the pollution of Tengger Desert. The case and its surrounding 
circumstances have been explained in detail elsewhere.42 Although this series of eight 
cases substantively concerned the same incident and issues, formally they each went 
through trial, appeal, retrial at the Supreme People’s Court before final settlement back 
at the first instance court, generating a paper trial of more than twenty documents in 
total on CJO. The inclusion of eight cases over substantively the same incident could 
also skew the picture when presented alongside others. 
Finally, there are inherent limitations to this study that relies exclusively on court 
judgments. There is little information on those cases that do not reach the court, for 
example the large number of pre-litigation environmental protection cases dealt with 
by the procuratorate discussed below. Nevertheless, the value of insights offered by 
hundreds of decided cases in a rigorous and penetrating examination of the practice of 
 
42 Xie and Xu (n 33). 
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EPIL in China arguably far outweighs such limitations. 
4. Research findings 
This section presents the results of this study of 549 cases in relation to the 
environmental elements involved, outcome of litigation, value of monetary claims for 
environmental damage, and value of claims for litigation costs. Those 21 cases of 
administrative EPIL do not fit comfortably into such breakdown and are treated 
separately. 
4.1 Main Environmental Elements 
The main environmental elements or causes for EPIL from these 549 cases are 
categorized as follows: 1) pollution and illegal discharge from manufacturing or 
farming processes, excluding air pollution; 2) air or atmospheric pollution 3) dumping 
of solid wastes, liquids, oil, silt and other hazardous substances such as medical wastes 
away from sites of production; 4) pollution or leakage caused by traffic accidents; 5) 
illegal mining; 6) occupation and / or destruction of forest, grassland or farmland; 7) 
fishing, hunting and other wildlife related activities, including illegal lumbering. There 
are a small number of cases which do not fit into any of these seven categories. Some 
cases reached settlement and were withdrawn where the judgments did not reveal the 
exact nature of any environmental harm concerned. 
Table 3 presents the number of cases in each category from NGOs, the procuratorate 
and the government. Figure 1 presents the frequency of each category as a percentage 




Table 3 Number of EPIL cases by environmental elements 
 NGOs Procuratorate Government Total 
Manufacturing or farming 
discharge 
41 101 9 151 
Air or atmospheric pollution 15 7 1 23 
Dumping of wastes, etc. 12 70 14 96 
Traffic accidents 0 7 8 15 
Mining 2 21 3 26 
Occupation and destruction of land 2 41 5 48 
Fishing, hunting, wildlife related 2 140 2 144 
Other 7 4 1 12 
Unknown 29 3 2 34 
 





4.2 Litigation Outcome 
For NGOs, out of 110 cases that reached a final resolution, they were successful or 
partly successful in 49 cases. They lost 3 cases outright. 10 cases reached settlement. 
NGOs withdrew litigation in 35 cases. 12 cases were rejected by the court due to reasons 
such as lack of standing to sue or other restrictions in the law. One case reached a special 
outcome when it was supplanted by EEDC litigation, explained below. 
For the procuratorate, out of 394 cases that reached a final resolution, the 
procuratorate were successful or partly successful in 383 cases. 4 cases were withdrawn 
by the procuratorate after the defendants fulfilled what was asked of them, while 6 cases 
reached settlement, all with the defendant paying the compensation originally 
demanded. Only in one case did the procuratorate fail to prevail on the substantive 
demand for compensation payment.43 In other words, in 99.7% of the procuratorial 
 














cases the defendant was found liable or agreed to take some responsibility for what the 
procuratorate claimed against them. 
In addition, the procuratorate also won all 21 administrative EPIL cases against the 
government. 
For the government, out of 45 cases that reached a final resolution, they were 
successful or partly successful in 27 cases. 8 cases reached settlement or had settlement 
agreement confirmed by the court. One case was withdrawn by the government after 
successful negotiation with the defendant. 9 cases were rejected by the court. 
Table 4 Success rate of EPIL cases 
 NGOs Government 
Success or partial success 49 27 
Settlement 10 8 
Loss 3 0 




Success Rate 79.7% 79.5% 
  
Table 4 presents a comparison of the success rate of NGOs and the government, 
 
院 (23 May 2019). 
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where withdrawn cases are excluded and settlements get counted as successful in 
fulfilling the demand of the claimants. The near perfect success in terms of outcome for 
procuratorial EPIL is left out from this comparison. It may be noted that the government 
did not lose a single case outright, while the NGO lost three times in court. The main 
contributor to the comparatively lower success rate of around 79% for either group of 
claimants is those 12 and 9 cases rejected by the court. The main reason for rejection 
of governmental cases is the lack of standing for lower-level government units,44 
especially under current EEDC policy that only authorizes provincial and prefectural 
level government or their delegated subordinates to sue.45 The reasons for rejection of 
those 12 NGO cases are more varied, including where the NGO failed to convince the 
court of its connection to environmental protection in order to bring EPIL,46 suing in a 
court with no jurisdiction over the subject matter,47 and at least four cases of maritime 
litigation, which is not permitted under current EPIL as to be discussed below. 
If these rejection cases are excluded from the calculation, then out of the 486 non-
withdrawn, non-rejected civil EPIL or EEDC cases, the three groups of claimants were 
ultimately successful, partly successful or agreed to settle in 483 of them, representing 
 
44 兰州市西固区环境保护局, (2018)甘民终 386 号, 甘肃省高级人民法院 (26 June 2018); 黄强勇 v 龙海市
水利局, (2018) 闽 06 民终 1109 号, 福建省漳州市中级人民法院 (21 June 2018); 青田县船寮镇人民政府 v 
孟州市泰兴汽车运输有限责任公司, (2019)浙 1121 民初 4042 号, 浙江省青田县人民法院 (9 Dec. 2019). 
45 Reform Plan of the Ecological Environmental Damage Compensation System (n 33), Part 4, Section 3. 
46 河南省企业社会责任促进中心 v 河北常恒能源技术开发有限公司, (2019)冀 01 民初 818 号, 河北省石家
庄市中级人民法院 (15 July 2019); 北京市丰台区源头爱好者环境研究所 v 中船海洋与房屋装备股份有限
公司, (2019) 粤 01 民初 1096 号, 广东省广州市中级人民法院 (25 Nov. 2019). 
47 北京市朝阳区自然之友环境研究所 v 中国石油天然气股份有限公司, (2017) 京民终 538 号, 北京市高级
人民法院 (14 Sept. 2017); 北京市朝阳区自然之友环境研究所 v 山东凯马汽车制造有限公司, (2018)京 04
民初 48 号, 北京市第四中级人民法院 (16 Aug. 2018). 
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an incredible 99.4% overall success rate. NGOs fared worst out of the three groups, 
having lost three out of 62 cases. Still that would mean a success rate of 95.2%. The 
high success rate of EPIL claimants will be analysed further below. 
 
4.3 Monetary Value of Claims for Environmental Compensation 
The majority of EPIL claims will specify a sum of environmental compensation to be 
paid by the defendant. There are often multiple components to this sum, typically 
including the costs for any emergency clear-up of pollution or hazard, the expected 
costs for full restoration of the environment, and the loss of environmental service 
function before such full restoration could be completed. In some cases, the claimants 
would only specify this monetary sum as an alternative to the demand of remedial work, 
i.e. compensation only payable if the defendant fails to remedy the situation a timely 
and satisfactory manner. In a small number of cases brought by NGOs, the claimant 
would make an unspecified monetary demand where ‘the exact sum is to be determined 
by forensic analysis’.48 
Out of 110 NGO cases, 50 included specific sums in the demand, while a further 8 
cases stipulated the to-be-determined monetary demand. Among those 50 cases with 
specified sums, 5 had value over 100 million RMB, 10 were between 10 million and 
100 million, 21 were between 1 million and 10 million, 8 were between 0.1 million and 
1 million, and 6 were below 0.1 million in value. 
 
48 E.g. 中华环境保护基金会 v 中国石油天然气股份有限公司大连石化分公司, (2016)辽 02 民初 267 号, 大
连市中级人民法院 (18 Dec. 2017); 中国生物多样性保护与绿色发展基金会 v 云南泽昌钛业有限公司, 
(2018) 云 01 民初 32 号, 昆明市中级人民法院 (12 Dec. 2018). 
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Out of 394 procuratorate cases, 346 included specific sums in the demand. Among 
those 346 cases, no case had value over 100 million RMB, 8 were between 10 million 
and 100 million, 73 were between 1 million and 10 million, 106 were between 0.1 
million and 1 million, and 159 were below 0.1 million in value. 
Out of 45 government cases, 42 included specific sums in the demand. Among those 
42 cases, 3 cases had value over 100 million RMB, 3 were between 10 million and 100 
million, 17 were between 1 million and 10 million, 16 were between 0.1 million and 1 
million, and 3 were below 0.1 million in value. 
 




In terms of the mean or median value of cases, those 50 NGO cases claimed a total 












Over 100 million 100 to 10 million 10 to 1 million 1 to 0.1 million below 0.1 million




value of 4.55 million. Bearing in mind the potentially distorting effect of extreme high 
value cases, by removing those 5 cases with value in excess of 100 million RMB, the 
average value of NGO cases comes down to 8.39 million per case. 
For procuratorate cases, those 346 cases with specified sums claimed a total sum of 
396 million RMB, or an average value of 1.15 million per case, with a median value of 
0.139 million. 
For government cases, those 42 cases with specified sums claimed a total sum of 908 
million RMB, or an average value of 21.63 million per case, with a median value of 
1.25 million. By removing those 3 cases with value in excess of 100 million RMB, the 
average value of government cases comes down to 4.55 million per case.  
In terms of actual award by the court, of the 1.442 billion RMB claimed in those 50 
NGO cases, the court upheld a total sum of 413 million, or 28.6% of the sum claimed. 
However, the two largest claims by NGOs, for 377 million 49  and 206 million 50 
respectively, both obtained no monetary award in the court, which would have notably 
distorted the figures. If these two zero-award cases are excluded, then NGO would have 
won 48.1% of the sum claimed. 
For procuratorate cases, of the 396 million claimed in 346 cases, the court upheld a 
total sum of 385 million, or 97.0% of the sum claimed. 
 
49 北京市朝阳区自然之友环境研究所 v 江苏常隆化工有限公司, (2017)苏民终 232 号, 江苏省高级人民法
院 (26 Dec. 2018). This case is discussed in detail by Xie and Xu (n 33). 
50 中国生物多样性保护与绿色发展基金会 v 山东金诚重油化工有限公司, (2016)鲁 01 民初 780 号, 济南市
中级人民法院 (27 Dec. 2018). This is the special case of NGO EPIL being supplanted by government EEDC 
lawsuit, discussed below. 
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For government cases, of the 908 million claimed in 42 cases, the court upheld a total 
sum of 658 million, or 75.4% of the sum claimed. 
Table 5 presents the comparison of case values and award values among the three 
groups of claimants, including adjusted figures by excluding certain extreme high value 
cases as explained above. 
 
Table 5 Monetary Value of Cases 
 NGOs Procuratorate Government 
Median value of cases (million RMB) 4.55 0.139 1.25 
Adjusted mean value per case (million 
RMB) 
8.39 1.15 4.55 
Adjusted award percentage 48.1% 97% 75.4% 
 
4.4 Litigation Costs 
The law on EPIL and policies on EEDC allow recovery of certain costs by the claimants 
against the defendants. The decision is largely at the discretion of the court and not 
explicitly dependent on the outcome or merit of the lawsuit,51 but it is customary that 
some costs will be awarded to the successful claimants at a level seen as ‘reasonable’ 
by the court. Current rules clearly favour claimants in EPIL, as there is no possibility 
 
51 Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues concerning the Application of Law in the Trial of 
Environmental Civil Public Interest Litigations, Art.22; Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Trial of 
Ecological Environmental Damage Compensation Cases, Art.14. 
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for the defendant to recover any costs from the claimant even if the claimant loses the 
case. 
For NGOs, their costs claim typically cover lawyers’ fees, cost of forensic analysis 
or expert reports, travel expenses of staff, and so on. Among those 50 NGO cases with 
specified monetary values, 47 of them came with a costs claim, totalling 17.98 million 
RMB, or 1.24% of the value of main claims. The court awarded 6.44 million in the end, 
or 36% of the claimed costs. The main reductions are high lawyers’ fees and other 
expenditures such as salaries and pension contribution for staff members, which the 
court regarded as unrelated or irrelevant to the litigation.52 
For the procuratorate, the main costs claimed cover forensic analysis or expert reports, 
as well as public announcement fees, which are routinely incurred as the procuratorate 
must make the effort to ask for NGOs to come forward to take EPIL first. Among the 
346 procuratorate cases with specified monetary values, 146 came with a costs claim, 
totalling 14.82 million RMB, or 3.74% of the value of the main claims. The court 
awarded 14.47 million in the end, or 97% of the claimed costs. It is noted that unlike 
the other two groups, the procuratorate never claim lawyers’ fees as procurators will 
attend court hearings themselves. 
Among the 42 government cases with specified monetary values, 19 came with a 
costs claim, totalling 3.99 million RMB, or 0.44% of the value of the main claims. The 
court awarded 2.74 million in the end, or 68% of the claimed costs. The notable 
 
52 北京市朝阳区自然之友环境研究所 v 江苏常隆化工有限公司, (2017)苏民终 232 号, 江苏省高级人民法
院 (26 Dec. 2018); 中国生物多样性保护与绿色发展基金会 v 马鞍山国翔环保科技有限公司, (2018)皖民终
826 号, 安徽省高级人民法院 (29 Dec. 2018). 
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reductions are high lawyers’ fees which the court regarded as beyond reasonable levels. 
 
Table 6 A comparison of claims for litigation costs by the three groups of claimants 
 
 NGOs Procuratorate Government 
Percentage of cases with a costs claim 94% 42% 45% 
Percentage of costs claimed to value of 
cases 
1.24% 3.74% 0.44% 
Percentage of costs awarded by the court 36% 97% 68% 
 
 
5. Analysis and Discussion 
5.1 High success rate overall in EPIL claims 
The conspicuously high success rate for EPIL claimants has been highlighted above. 
By excluding rejected and withdrawn cases, EPIL claimants prevail in more than 99% 
of the decided cases. Only NGOs have really lost in a handful of cases, bringing its 
success rate down to a still impressive 95%. Underlying such statistics, a notable aspect 
of current EPIL claims in China is that the vast majority of cases are not controversial 
or substantially contested. Regardless of the environmental elements involved or the 
type of claimants, in most EPIL the defendant is willing to admit the fact that activities 
allegedly causing environmental harm had taken place. Among the hundreds of cases 
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examined, few defendants seriously attempted to argue that such activity never 
happened or that such incident had nothing to do with them. The main arguments for 
most defendants would typically focus around the extent of liabilities, 53  items 
claimable following an incident, 54  the methods for calculation of environmental 
damage and repair cost,55 the allocation of responsibilities among co-defendants,56 
and so on. Quite often the defence or response in court submitted by a defendant was 
more of a pleading than any plea based on legal principles, such as that the cost of 
forensic analysis was too high or that the defendant could not afford what was 
demanded.57 Generally speaking, for the overwhelming majority of cases that reach 
the stage of substantive judgment by the court, the defendants know and accept that 
they are liable for something. The court case is really about exactly how much they are 
liable for. It is very unusual for any claimant, be it the procuratorate, the government or 
an NGO, to lose any EPIL at this late stage, provided that they have cleared the earlier 
 
53 新郑市薛店镇人民政府 v 中国生物多样性保护与绿色发展基金会, (2018) 豫民终 344 号, 河南省高级人
民法院 (12 June 2018), the first instance court calculated damages for loss of service functions due to lumbering 
activities as equivalent of a five-year period. On appeal, the claimant NGO wanted ten times the amount awarded, 
which was rejected by the appellate court. 
54 无锡市锡山区人民政府厚桥街道办事处 v 上海市闵行区梅陇镇城市网格化综合管理中心, (2018) 苏
0205 民初 2606 号, 江苏省无锡市锡山区人民法院 (5 Nov. 2019), the claim for interest on the cost of emergency 
remedial work following waste dumping was rejected by the court. 郭家成 v 广东省广州市人民检察院, (2019)
粤民终 925 号, 广东省高级人民法院 (31 Dec. 2019), the defendants argued on appeal, unsuccessfully, that they 
should not be liable for the cost of forensic analysis. 
55 云浮市云城区人民检察院 v 林进坚, (2020) 粤 53 刑终 30 号, 广东省云浮市中级人民法院 (1 July 2020), 
the defendants successfully argued on appeal that the amount of profit made from illegal waste dumping should not 
be included in the calculation for cost of environmental remedy. 
56 安徽省芜湖县人民检察院 v 凤某某, (2020) 皖 0221 刑初 15 号, 安徽省芜湖县人民法院 (28 June 2020);  
57 东莞市环境科学学会 v 何树朝, (2018) 粤 01 民初 707 号, 广东省广州市中级人民法院 (23 July 2019); 
中华环保联合会 v 朱宏根, (2018) 苏 05 民初 1192 号, 江苏省苏州市中级人民法院 (26 Dec. 2019); 四川省
高县人民检察院 v 曾庆云, (2019) 川 1525 刑初 17 号, 四川省高县人民法院 (18 July 2019). 
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hurdles such as having the standing to sue or suing in a court with jurisdiction. 
In this regard, the three cases lost by NGOs may provide some insight on how the 
unusual occurrence of losing an EPIL claim could nevertheless happen.  
1) In the first case from Liaoning, the NGO alleged that several companies dumped 
large volume of sludge on certain sites near the provincial capital Shenyang, causing 
environmental harm.58 However, it was established in the court proceeding that the 
sludge was from the normal operation of wastewater treatment plants serving the city, 
with all companies involved properly licensed by the city government and the sites for 
storage legally leased for such purposes. The storage of sludge was necessary at the 
time because Shenyang had no facility to process it. Since the establishment of new 
facilities, there was no addition of new sludge and the city government had been 
gradually clearing the storage sites since 2014. The defendants were not liable for 
essentially doing what was properly authorized and contracted by the government to do 
as part of the waste management of the city. 
2) In the second case from Beijing, the NGO alleged that a property developer filled 
up ponds and wetlands in its construction of a residential development, causing 
environmental harm and loss of service functions. 59  After consideration of the 
evidence provided by all sides including environmental agencies of the Beijing 
municipal government, the court found that the so-called ponds and wetlands had dried 
up naturally years before the developer started any construction and the remnant plant 
growths represented fire and health hazards for the residents and the area. The 
 
58 中华环保联合会 v 国电东北环保产业集团有限公司, (2018) 辽民终 122 号, 辽宁省高级人民法院 (25 
June 2018). 
59 北京市朝阳区自然之友环境研究所 v 北京都市芳园房地产开发有限公司, (2015) 四中民初字第 233 号, 
北京市第四中级人民法院 (24 Dec. 2018). 
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developer’s action in filling up the sites and digging up new artificial ponds in 
compliance with law and regulations was not harmful in anyway to the environment. 
3) In the final case from Yunnan, the NGO alleged that an aborted construction 
project left some land with significant risks of landslide and environmental damage.60 
The defendant construction company provided photographic evidence and expert 
opinions that the pre-construction land was always liable to such risks, and that they 
have made all reasonable efforts such as replanting following the withdrawal of the 
project to minimize the risks. This convinced the court to reject all demands of the NGO. 
The commonality of these three losses by NGOs is that they failed to establish any 
illegality or negligence by the defendants, who have essentially complied with the 
existing environmental law and regulations in the course of their normal business. It 
may be far more difficult for the court to support any allegation of liabilities in such 
cases. Whether the existing law should have allowed activities such as the storage of 
sludge, which could perhaps cause detriment to the environment, seems to be a different 
matter that the Chinese court may not be prepared to contemplate. It may also be 
surmised that neither the procuratorate nor the government would have taken any of the 
defendants in these three cases to court. Nevertheless, the fact that NGOs are not afraid 
of taking on the difficult cases of ‘lawful operation within the law’ is an important part 
of their contribution to the environmental governance of China, to be revisited below. 
 
5.2 Superior performance by the procuratorate 
Even against the background of high success rate overall for all EPIL claimants, the 
 
60 中国生物多样性保护与绿色发展基金会 v 云南建投第十一建设有限公司, (2019)云 29 民初 6 号, 云南省
大理白族自治州中级人民法院 (9 Oct. 2019). 
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performance of the procuratorate is still noteworthy for the scale and efficiency of its 
operation. They currently take more than 95% of EPIL cases to the court out of the three 
groups. They make sure that the defendants are liable in 99% of the cases, winning 
virtually every case that eventually reached the judgment stage. Their claims for 
compensation and costs are upheld by the court to around 97% of the value. No case 
seems too small for them as they routinely take on EPIL for a few thousands RMB; yet 
they are equally competent to handle cases valued at tens of millions. 
It may be tempting here to draw parallel with the famous or infamous 99% conviction 
rate in criminal proceedings for Chinese prosecutors in an authoritarian system.61 
There may also be some truth in that the procuratorate is a powerful institution in the 
Chinese legal system,62 while the court is often seen as lacking in independence and 
authority in relation to the procuratorate and the government.63 Nevertheless, any 
broad scepticism about the Chinese political and legal system would not be able to 
explain the fact that the government actually performs much poorer than the 
procuratorate in EPIL (75% of claim values compared to 97% of the procuratorate; 68% 
of costs claimed compared to than 97% of the procuratorate), or indeed have a 
marginally lower ‘success rate’ than NGOs in all non-withdrawn cases. The 
comprehensive success of the procuratorate in EPIL indicate that they are doing 
something differently, and arguably more efficiently than the other two groups. 
 
61 Li Li, ‘High rates of prosecution and conviction in China: the use of passive coping strategies’ (2014) 42(3) 
International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 271-285. It should be noted that a 99% conviction rate is not 
necessarily the sign of an authoritarian system, as for example China’s democratic neighbour Japan displays the 
same characteristic, see David Johnson, ‘Japan’s Prosecution System’ (2012) 41 Crime and Justice 35-74, 45. 
62 Yu Mou, ‘Overseeing Criminal Justice: The Supervisory Role of the Public Prosecution Service in China’ (2017) 
44 Journal of Law and Society 620-645, 626. 
63 Randall Peerenboom, ‘Judicial Independence in China’ in Randall Peerenboom (ed) Judicial Independence in 
China (2010, Cambridge University Press) 82-84. 
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It is very likely that the selection of cases to litigate has had the greatest impact on 
the outcome. Although the procuratorate are bringing forward close to 2,000 EPIL cases 
every year, this is merely a tip of the iceberg in terms of the environmental cases 
handled by the massive system of the People’s Procuratorate. In 2018, the procuratorate 
handled 59,312 public interest cases in relation to ecological and environmental 
protection.64 In 2019, the count went up to 69,236.65 In other words, only about 3% of 
the EPIL cases handled by the procuratorate are actually brought to the court. There is 
no statistics available on what exactly happened to the other 97% of cases which did 
not reach the court. It is clear that the majority of cases are resolved in the ‘pre-litigation 
procedures’, which the procuratorate follow prior to civil or administrative EPIL before 
actually initiating litigation in court.66 This is where the procuratorate notifies the other 
party of their intention to consider EPIL in advance, where demands such as timely 
remedy of wrongdoing or performance of legal duties could be made. It has been 
reported that in 97.7% of cases, a governmental department will respond positively to 
pre-litigation procuratorial ‘opinion’ demanding the performance of duties, hence 
avoiding the need for litigation.67 The rate of positive response or due compliance 
would likely be lower for potential defendants in civil EPIL cases. Still, the fact that the 
procuratorate only select 1 in 30 cases to go to the court is likely to be instrumental in 
 
64 Annual Report of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate for 2018 (12 Mar. 2019), full text in Chinese available at 
https://www.spp.gov.cn/spp/tt/201903/t20190312_411422.shtml.  
65 Annual Report of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate for 2019 (25 May 2020), full text in Chinese available at 
https://www.spp.gov.cn/spp/gzbg/202006/t20200601_463798.shtml.  
66 Zhang Feng, ‘检察环境公益诉讼之诉前程序研究 <Research into the Pre-trial Procedure of Prosecutorial 
Environment Public Interest Litigation>’ (2018)(11) Political Science and Law 151 
67 ‘<The procuratorate set up 113,848 cases of public interest litigation in the first eleven months of 2019>’, Xinhua 
News Agency (14 May 2020), available at http://www.xinhuanet.com/legal/2020-05/14/c_1125981755.htm.  
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the impressive 99% success rate. 
The really fascinating question, about which there is virtually no information 
available, is whether the procuratorate would follow up on every case that did not 
generate a positive response from the pre-litigation procedure, especially in cases where 
there is a chance the procuratorate would not win comfortably. Judging by the 394 civil 
EPIL cases brought by the procuratorate, it may be said that they are certainly not 
adventurous in their selection of cases to litigate. It is simply unknown whether the 
procuratorate will bring EPIL and risk losing a case if there is foreseeable uncertainty 
or difficulty, or whether they would play it safe and opt for the numerous other 
straightforward cases instead. 
Meanwhile, this level of success of the procuratorate could also be explained by their 
legal expertise and accumulated experiences. More than three thousand procuratorates 
in China are staffed by more than 60,000 legally qualified procurators, ready to be sent 
into action in the nearest court, which forms a far stronger force of legal expertise than 
either NGOs or local government could summon. In cases covered by this study, for 
instance, it is fairly common for the procuratorate to send one team of procurators for 
the criminal proceeding and another team for the attached civil EPIL. In contrast, due 
to constraints such as available funding to be discussed below, the typical line-up for 
NGO cases is one non-lawyer NGO staff member and one instructed lawyer, often from 
Beijing or another province. Even when an NGO manages to put together a makeshift 
team of two or more lawyers, it has not always left the court with any good impression. 
In one case, for example, a court in Guizhou Province explicitly questioned the NGO’s 
decision to instruct lawyers from two different firms respectively based in Beijing and 
Anhui as ‘seemingly unnecessary’, and in turn awarded only 100,000 RMB of the 
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550,000 RMB lawyers’ fees claimed.68 Moreover, with the large number of EPIL cases 
litigated by procurators every year, there are clear patterns emerging in the technical 
approach to many of the commonplace cases. Procurators now mostly travel on well-
trodden paths in these cases in terms of what facts to prove, which forensic analysis to 
instruct, how to calculate compensation, what demands to make of the defendant, and 
so on. In essence, these are teams of legal professionals operating in a familiar 
environment, doing things they are comfortable with and increasingly experienced in. 
It will indeed be surprising if they are not faring better than a solitary lawyer flown in 
from another part of the country on an ad hoc basis. 
Moreover, this combination of professionalism and lasting local connection seems to 
contribute to a broader vision of what EPIL could bring, than straightforward monetized 
compensation. In many cases, the procuratorate would demand remedial work instead 
of monetary compensation, and only specify the sum of compensation as an alternative 
if the work is not carried out in a timely fashion to a satisfactory standard. The 
procuratorate could also be agreeable to change their demands in response to the 
circumstances of the defendant. In multiple cases, for example, community work for 
environmental causes have been accepted as an alternative to monetary compensation 
where the defendants pleaded financial hardship.69 Occasionally the procuratorate may 
even drop parts of a claim where the defendant was viewed as repentant.70 In two cases 
 
68 中国生物多样性保护与绿色发展基金会 v 中国铝业股份有限公司, (2016)黔 0181 民初 138 号, 贵州省清
镇市人民法院 (26 Oct. 2017). 
69 缙云县人民检察院 v 傅彩伟, (2018)浙 11 民初 104 号, 浙江省丽水市人民法院 (29 Nov. 2018); 马鞍山市
人民检察院 v 吴必祥, (2019)皖 05 民初 376 号, 安徽省马鞍山市人民法院 (27 Dec. 2019). 
70 绩溪县人民检察院 v 程光钧, (2018)皖 1824 刑初 75 号, 安徽省绩溪县人民法院 (25 Oct. 2018). 
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on air pollution from manufacturing by the same procuratorate in Jiangsu Province, 40% 
of the compensation awarded by the court was suspended for two years, to be held as a 
fund from which any investment the defendants make for improving environmental 
protection in the manufacturing process could be reimbursed.71 Such willingness by 
the procuratorate to adjust to the different circumstances of cases and defendants and 
the capacity to be involved in any follow-up matters such as the verification of remedial 
work could well explain the readiness by the court to grant what is asked for. 
 
5.3 The triangle of relationships among NGOs, the procuratorate and the government 
The scale and efficiency of the procuratorate’s work put NGOs in an interesting position. 
The current design of EPIL framework dictates that the procuratorate should only start 
civil EPIL where there is no government or eligible NGO willing to initiate 
proceeding.72 In practice, this means that before any EPIL, the procuratorate would put 
out a public announcement calling for any NGO to come forward and take a case to 
court. The theory, or original intention, is for NGOs to take the lead in litigation while 
the procuratorate should only provide a backup. The reality, as reflected in the data 
above, is that not only are NGOs incapable of fulfilling this role, they are ultimately 
unwilling to do so. 
The capacity for litigation by the procuratorate has already been analysed. NGOs do 
 
71 无锡市人民检察院 v 江阴市海隆汽车销售服务有限公司, (2019)苏 02 民初 281 号, 江苏省无锡市人民法
院 (3 Apr. 2020); 无锡市人民检察院 v 江阴星现汽车销售服务有限公司, (2019)苏 02 民初 282 号, 江苏省
无锡市人民法院 (3 Apr. 2020). 
72 Civil Procedure Law of PRC, Article 55. 
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not have the personnel or resources to match, which is perhaps both understandable and 
expected. It is noted that in China’s political system, NGOs are strictly controlled in 
registration, fund-raising and management and hence operate in a far more restrictive 
environment than their counterparts in western Europe or North America. Although 
there are more than one thousand registered NGOs who could potentially bring EPIL,73 
many of them are small, under-funded74 and have rarely engaged in any litigation 
before. However, the more concerning aspect is about those NGOs that are capable of 
litigation that make starkly different choices in terms of the monetized value of cases 
as compared to the procuratorate. As the data above shows, the bulk of procuratorial 
EPIL cases are low in monetary value; over a half of the 346 cases examined are for 
140,000 RMB or less. From the 50 NGO cases examined, only eight had a monetized 
value below 200,000 RMB. 
Interestingly, all eight cases were from Jiangsu Province, while seven of them were 
decided between September 2014 and June 2016, within the first two years of EPIL in 
China. These early, small-value cases witnessed a clear pattern of collaboration between 
NGOs and the procuratorate, where the latter helped with the instruction of forensics 
and other preparation of cases, as well as sending procurators to the trial in support of 
the former.75 Jiangsu is widely seen as the province where EPIL first took off back in 
 
73 Na Huang and Jiaming Du, ‘社会组织参与环境公益诉讼的优化路径 <Optimized Path for Social Organization 
Participating in Environmental Public Interest Litigation>’ (2018) 36(9) Hebei Law Science 191–200. 
74 Guttman (n 21) 
75 E.g. 连云港市赣榆区环境保护协会 v 王升杰, (2014)连环公民初字第 00002 号, 连云港市中级人民法院
(9 Sept. 2014); 镇江市生态环境公益保护协会 v 唐长海, (2015)镇民公初字第 00002 号, 镇江市中级人民法
院(23 June 2015); 中国生物多样性保护与绿色发展基金会 v 张虎, (2015)徐环公民初字第 1 号, 徐州市中级
人民法院 (27 June 2016). 
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2014, especially when a landmark award of 161 million was obtained by a local NGO 
against polluting manufacturers,76 sending signals of encouragement to others around 
the country. With hindsight, that early achievement may well be the most successful 
example of NGO EPIL to date. Yet NGOs, perhaps emboldened by the success and 
headline-grabbing figures, seemed keen to move on to ‘bigger’ things elsewhere. 
The median value of NGO cases is now 32 times higher than that of procuratorial 
cases. A typical NGO EPIL case is in the millions, not thousands or tens of thousands 
anymore. In some cases, NGOs with no previous record of having won any EPIL cases 
claimed tens of millions in their first ventures into EPIL, which often did not go 
smoothly in the end. 77  It is unknown how, even whether, NGOs consider those 
newspaper announcements routinely put out by the procuratorate calling for NGOs to 
bring EPIL. In any event, the vast majority of these announcements have gone 
unanswered. The data above suggests that they will continue to go unanswered, as 
NGOs are simply not interested in the low-value end of EPIL in which the procuratorate 
are mainly operating. 
Instead, the data shows that NGOs perform most similarly to the government in EPIL. 
NGOs and the government handle comparable numbers of EPIL cases each year. Both 
work with cases that are much higher in value than the procuratorate’s, though NGO 
 
76 江苏常隆农化有限公司 v 泰州市环保联合会, (2014)苏环公民终字第 00001 号, 江苏省高级人民法院 (29 
Dec. 2014). 
77 E.g. 北京市丰台区源头爱好者环境研究所 v 镇江文化旅游产业集团有限责任公司, (2019)苏 11 民初 124
号, 镇江市中级人民法院 (15 Jan. 2020), stipulated 15 million RMB as compensation. The case was eventually 
withdrawn by the NGO. 北京市丰台区源头爱好者环境研究所 v 泰兴市友联精细化工有限公司, (2019)苏 12
民初 79 号, 泰兴市中级人民法院 (10 May 2020), the exact demand made in the case was unclear from the final 
judgment allowing withdrawal by the NGO. But judging from the court fees of RMB 295,300, which the court 
waived for the benefit of the NGO, the claim value must have exceeded 20 million. 
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cases are still higher in value than the government’s. They achieve similar levels of 
success in terms of outcome. They claim comparable amount in costs in comparable 
numbers of cases, though NGOs tend to claim more and get less. 
Should NGOs see their future role in EPIL as comparable to the government, 
however, it is important to point out one significant difference between the relationships 
in EPIL of the procuratorate to NGOs and the government to NGOs. As explained above, 
the law gives preference to NGO EPIL over procuratorial EPIL, so that the 
procuratorate should only litigate if NGOs do not. Yet between NGO EPIL and 
government EEDC lawsuit, the current judicial interpretations explicitly give 
preferences to government EEDC. The commencement of EEDC litigation will suspend 
any ongoing EPIL about the same incident until full resolution of the EEDC case, and 
the EPIL can only resume afterwards to cover issues not already dealt with in the EEDC 
case.78 This ‘competition’ has already occurred in practice, where a 206 million RMB 
NGO EPIL case was supplanted by a 231 million RMB EEDC claim from the local 
government.79 Had the award been made to the original NGO case, this would have 
been the largest win for any NGO EPIL. Yet not only might the NGO feel that they had 
their big win ‘stolen’ by the local government, this could also mean considerable 
uncertainty and costs for the NGOs in future cases. With the gradual formalization of 
EEDC, it is unclear whether NGOs have realized, or adjusted to, this change from being 
the favoured litigants in relation to the procuratorate since 2014, to the deferred 
 
78 Judicial Interpretation 2019/No.8 of the Supreme People’s Court, Art.17. 
79 中国生物多样性保护与绿色发展基金会 v 山东金诚重油化工有限公司,  
(2016)鲁 01 民初 780 号, 山东省济南市中级人民法院 (27 Dec. 2018); 山东省生态环境厅 v 山东金诚重油
化工有限公司, (2017)鲁 01 民初 1467 号, 山东省济南市中级人民法院 (21 Dec. 2018). 
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claimants in relation to the government since 2018. Consciously or otherwise, it would 
seem that NGOs have moved away from working closely with the procuratorate in the 
early days of EPIL on a larger number of low-value cases, as seen in Jiangsu, to a 
position where they would be effectively competing with the government in a smaller 
number of high value cases. 
So far, local government has not been outperforming NGOs. The uncertainty and the 
non-legislation status of EEDC policies have continued to be a hindrance to many 
EEDC attempts. There is considerable discrepancy in the approach to EEDC across 
different parts of China. Qingdao in Shandong Province, for example, authorized all its 
subsidiary districts, which would be county-level government, to initiate EEDC without 
further approval from the prefectural city government.80 In contrast, several county-
level government units had their EEDC lawsuits rejected by the court because they 
could not prove authorization by the provincial or prefectural government, including in 
Shandong Province.81 Nevertheless, it is common sense that the government in China 
would have far more resources at their disposal than NGOs. They have also only 
properly entered the fray for no more than two to three years. Once policies surrounding 
EEDC become clearer and more consistent legal rules, and once local government and 
their instructed lawyers have had a bit more time to learn and a few more cases to learn 
from, it is foreseeable that EEDC will dominate ‘big’ cases such as those with values 
in the tens of millions. NGOs would then be caught between a rock and a hard place, 
 
80 青岛市李沧区人民政府 v 刘永进, (2019)鲁 02 民初 1579 号, 青岛市中级人民法院 (27 Sep. 2019). 
81 黄强勇 v 龙海市水利局, (2018)闽 06 民终 1109 号, 漳州市中级人民法院 (21 June 2018); 兰州市西固区
环境保护局, (2018)甘民终 386 号, 甘肃省高级人民法院 (26 June 2018); 日照市生态环境局五莲县分局 v 
万立强, (2019)鲁 11 民初 298 号, 日照市中级人民法院 (6 Jan. 2020). 
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with the procuratorate efficiently dealing with routine low-value cases, that NGOs lost 
interest in since 2016, and the government taking all the EEDC actions as the preferred 
litigants. 
5.4 Different areas of expertise and focus  
Such a sombre possibility, if not prediction, should certainly be avoided for a better 
system of environmental protection and governance. NGOs have already proven that 
they can offer something that the efficiency of the procuratorate or the resources of the 
government may be less able to deliver on. There are areas, such as water or ground 
pollution caused by manufacturing or farming discharge and waste dumping, where all 
the claimants have demonstrated willingness to get involved in. Yet in other areas, the 
different focus in terms of the environmental elements by the different EPIL claimants 
would best illustrate the importance of the continuing contribution of NGOs. 
Among the cases examined in this study, air or atmospheric pollution is a stand-out 
focal point by NGOs. This is consistent with the general perception of air pollution as 
a major environmental problem in China.82 In contrast, both the procuratorate and the 
government have largely stayed away from this area, at least in terms of EPIL. Air 
pollution accounts for 13.6% of NGO cases, while only 1.8% and 2.2% of procuratorate 
and government EPIL. A close analysis of the statistics exposes even greater disparity 
between the groups. For example, although 7 out of 394 procuratorate cases are 
classified as relating to air pollution, only 3 of these 7 were against pollution by legally 
operating manufacturers. The other four were against blatantly illegal activities such as 
 
82 Mun S Ho and Chris P Nielsen (eds), Clearing the air: the health and economic damages of air pollution in China 
(MIT Press, 2007) 3-4 
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burning electronic wastes to extract aluminium or burning batteries to extract lead. Two 
of those three cases against manufacturers were by the same procuratorate in Jiangsu, 
mentioned above in relation to the incentive fund set up to encourage cleaner production. 
In other words, in 394 cases, out of thousands of procuratorates in China, only two have 
sued any lawful manufacturer about air pollution. It is unknown why the procuratorate 
do not act more often on this. It could be that they have settled many disputes in the 
pre-litigation procedures described above, though there is no information available to 
further investigate this possibility. Other speculations may be that it would be more 
difficult to assess air pollution and its consequences as compared to ground or water 
pollution that the procuratorate have got used to, or that it would be more uncertain 
whether the court would support the full extent of claimed compensation. 
Some of the NGO experience could illustrate the potential difficulty in this area. In 
a high profile case from Zhejiang, the NGO sued an online vendor of a ‘cheating device’ 
that could potentially help car owners cheat the emission tests on their annual vehicle 
check.83 Over 30,000 of such devices were sold on Taobao, the largest online trading 
platform in China. The NGO wanted Taobao to be jointly liable for 152 million RMB 
as compensation for damage to the atmosphere. However, the court found that Taobao 
had taken actions as soon as it became aware of any illegality and was therefore not 
liable. In the end, only the vendor company was found liable for 3.5 million RMB. A 
final footnote to the uncertainties of such air pollution claims is that the company was 
later found to have no asset for enforcement, rendering not only the 3.5 million RMB 
 
83 中国生物多样性保护与绿色发展基金会 v 浙江淘宝网络有限公司, (2019)浙民终 863 号, 浙江省高级人
民法院 (14 Oct. 2019). 
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judgment worthless but also the NGO out of pocket for its lawyers’ fees.84 
Regardless of such difficulties, it is important to recognize that NGOs are clearly 
pursuing polluters on certain issues publicly in court, where the procuratorate or the 
government are lagging behind. Even the three ‘lost’ cases brought by NGOs, examined 
above, are obviously worthy discussions to be had in a court of law about the 
environmental implications of certain activities and operations. This would seem to be 
a good enough reason for the system of EPIL to continue to support and nurture the 
participation of NGOs, to test the boundaries of what current Chinese environmental 
law permits or prohibits. 
5.5 Difficulties in NGO case choices and costs 
Nevertheless, the insistence by some NGOs over other areas of environmental 
protection could sometimes appear less than fully rational. For example, Chinese law 
currently only allows governmental departments of marine administration to sue for 
damage to the environment of the sea.85 This excludes not only NGOs but also most 
government units under current EEDC policy.86 The exclusion has been consistently 
upheld by various courts, including the Supreme People’s Court.87 But the denial only 
seems to stimulate multiple NGOs to bring forward lawsuits anyway, to be rejected by 
the court, and to subsequently voice concerns over not being able to sue on maritime 
 
84 中国生物多样性保护与绿色发展基金会 v 深圳市速美环保有限公司, (2020) 浙 01 执 857 号之一, 浙江
省杭州市中级人民法院 (22 Dec. 2020). 
85 Law of Marine Environment Protection of PRC, Art.89. 
86 Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Trial of Ecological Environmental Damage Compensation Cases, 
Art.2. 
87 北京市朝阳区自然之友环境研究所 v 荣成伟伯渔业有限公司, (2019)最高法民申 6214 号, 最高人民法院 
(21 Dec. 2019). 
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incidents.88 Such persistence may well be reflective of the dissatisfaction NGOs are 
facing in terms of what they want to achieve and what they can achieve in EPIL. 
It is not an overstatement to say that NGOs may find themselves in some sort of 
dilemma with regard to EPIL. They do not have the resources of the procuratorate or 
the government, which means they must litigate fewer cases. Meanwhile, NGOs seem 
to aim for as much impact as possible from a small number of cases, so collectively 
leave the low-value, straightforward ones to the procuratorate. Nevertheless, the high-
profile cases are more uncertain and more difficult to win, with the costs being higher 
as well. Experienced lawyers willing to take these cases are few and far between, given 
the low number of cases, and may charge higher fees. The court does not always award 
the full costs even if NGOs win, which means there is even less money to fund the next 
round of litigation. This seems to be a downward spiral that severely diminishes the 
enthusiasm and capacity of NGOs in bringing forward EPIL. 
On the point of lawyers’ fees, it is hardly true that the court are being overly strict 
against NGOs. The government often has harder times in the court. Local government 
opted to drop claims for lawyers’ fees or had such claims dismissed in multiple EEDC 
cases.89 In the aforementioned 206 million RMB NGO case supplanted by EEDC, the 
NGO claimed 300,000 RMB of lawyers’ fees. They may feel hard done by when the 
court only awarded 100,000 (33%). Nevertheless, the government, after winning 231 
 
88 China Biodiversity Conservation and Green Development Foundation, ‘关于明确社会组织作为海洋环境公益
诉讼原告建议 <Suggestion for confirming social organizations as claimants in maritime environmental public 
interest litigation>’ (10 Feb. 2021), available at https://www.sohu.com/a/450367096_100001695.  
89 江苏省人民政府 v 安徽海德化工科技有限公司, (2017)苏 12 民初 51 号, 江苏省泰州市人民法院 (16 Aug. 
2018); 山东省生态环境厅 v 山东道一新能源科技有限公司, (2018)鲁 0102 民初 8787 号, 济南市历下区人
民法院(1 Apr. 2019). 
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million from this EEDC case, claimed 1.085 million of lawyers’ fees but only received 
200,000 (18%). Perhaps when NGOs look back to the 2014 landmark victory in Jiangsu 
mentioned above, they could also take note of the fact that after winning 161 million 
for public interest, the local NGO claimed the total costs of 0.1 million, which was 
awarded in full by the court. It is simply a part of current Chinese legal practice that the 
court will frown at high lawyers’ fees. The impact is likely to be heavier on NGOs than 
local government, simply because the latter would have more resources to absorb such 
costs. 
 
6. Policy Recommendations 
6.1 Involvement of local NGOs and low-value cases 
There may be several measures that NGOs could take to improve their position, while 
it will likely take an effective combination of many changes to really propel NGO EPIL 
to a level of success some had hoped to achieve. Firstly, it would seem important for 
more NGOs to get into EPIL, especially the local NGOs on the ‘smaller’ cases. Of the 
earlier success stories from Jiangsu Province, there was a healthy line-up of major 
national NGOs and local NGOs, dealing with a spread of cases ranging from 160 
million to tens of thousands, with documented support from the procuratorate. It would 
seem that this spectrum of cases has largely been lost in the following years, with 
virtually no NGO responding to calls by the procuratorate to take on small, run-of-the-
mill EPIL cases. It is suggested that experience and knowledge of the system are 
important in EPIL, as in any litigation or any legal system. It may be helpful if NGOs, 
especially the smaller, local NGOs, would start building their base of knowledge and 
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experience on the smaller cases, instead of having the focus of EPIL turned exclusively 
towards the handful of monumental disputes repeatedly highlighted in the media. 
Although smaller cases would normally carry lower risks, they could actually incur 
higher ‘running costs’. As the data above show, despite the fact that the procuratorate 
never claims lawyers’ fees, their litigation costs as a percentage of the claim value is 
much higher than both NGOs and the government. These are mostly costs for forensic 
analysis to assess environmental damage. This would mean that NGOs, even for those 
focusing on the smaller cases, would need to secure a stable base of funding in the realm 
of EPIL operation. The good news here is that, unlike lawyers’ fees which the court 
would almost always closely scrutinize, there is far less argument over actually incurred 
costs of forensic analysis. The court has dismissed challenges by defendants against 
forensic fees several times over the actual sum for compensation, because the analysis, 
for example of subterranean water pollution, was costly but necessary.90 
6.2 Personnel and financial support for EPIL 
Alongside the knowhow and resources to instruct necessary forensic analysis, it 
would seem equally important for NGOs to find and develop a team of lawyers that 
they can rely upon, whom are not ostensibly motivated by half a million in fees. 
Understandably, some lawyers will be more reluctant to act in an area that they are less 
familiar with or less experienced in, and could charge higher fees. It is encouraging to 
see some of the major national NGOs now putting out job advertisement for in-house 
‘public-interest lawyer’ positions, though this may be beyond the reach of most Chinese 
environmental NGOs but the largest ones. On the other hand, NGOs and the public 
 
90 天津市东丽区生态环境局 v 张长江, (2019)津 03 民初 217 号, 天津市第三中级人民法院 (15 Apr. 2020). 
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interest aspect could play an important role here in broadening the appeal of EPIL and 
secure more favourable terms. In a case from Henan, for example, the terms of service 
secured by a local NGO with its lawyers were quoted with apparent approval by the 
court. The agreed fees were heavily discounted on the standard level, fixed with no 
additional extras, and only payable on success from the amount awarded by the court 
and actually paid by the defendant to the NGO.91 This seems a far more agreeable 
approach to support EPIL, than some NGOs’ emerging practice of asking for lawyers’ 
fees after a single hearing that would be many times over the average annual individual 
income of where they are litigating in.92 
At the heart of these potential changes should be the practical understanding that 
EPIL is a costly system for NGOs, the procuratorate and the government alike. The 
procuratorates have thrown thousands of procurators at it to achieve the level of success 
they current enjoy. Any conception of winner-takes-all with all costs reimbursed is 
simply not applicable to the Chinese legal system. The lack of financial resources has 
always been seen as the biggest obstacle in NGO’s EPIL practice,93 and it is unlikely 
the problem would be solved substantially through litigation costs claim. NGOs should 
have plans and strategies to properly finance EPIL operations, rather than trying in vain 
to claim the salaries and pensions of their staff members in the court. They should also 
 
91 洛阳市吉利区辉鹏养殖专业合作社 v 河南省企业社会责任促进中心, (2018)豫民终 1525 号, 河南省高级
人民法院 (27 May 2019). 
92 中国生物多样性保护与绿色发展基金会 v 中国铝业股份有限公司, (2016)黔 0181 民初 138 号, 贵州省清
镇市人民法院 (26 Oct. 2017); 中国生物多样性保护与绿色发展基金会 v 山西天脊潞安化工有限公司, 
(2016)晋 04 民初 35 号, 长治市中级人民法院 (11 July 2018); 中国生物多样性保护与绿色发展基金会 v 浙
江富邦集团有限公司, (2018) 浙民终 1015 号, 浙江省高级人民法院 (25 Apr. 2019). 
93 Tiantian Zhang and Yen-Chiang Chang, ‘Standing of Environmental Public-Interest Litigants in China: Evolution, 
Obstacles and Solutions' (2018) Journal of Environmental Law 369-397, 385. 
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think more carefully about the areas they want to get into in terms of practical 
implications. For example, maritime disputes mentioned above are notably costly and 
tricky due to the likely scale of damage and the difficulty in establishing evidence.94 In 
a pre-EEDC case from Zhejiang, even a partially successful claim led to court fees in 
excess of one million RMB for the government.95 Furthermore, administrative EPIL 
that the procuratorate have been engaging with, which multiple NGOs have voiced their 
desire to have a share in, award nothing in terms of costs or lawyers’ fees. Questions 
may legitimately be asked of NGOs as to why they think they have the expertise and 
resources to handle maritime or administrative EPIL, while most of them would turn 
down approaches from the procuratorate to help with even the simplest of cases, citing 
the lack of resources. 
Environmental NGOs’ increasing rights-awareness and technical expertise have put 
them in an unprecedented position informing and influencing both the legislative and 
administrative agenda of the Chinese government on environmental governance. At the 
same time, NGOs’ relation to the state is also experiencing changes, representing 
citizens’ demands for democracy in China’s restrictive political reforms, where NGOs’ 
practising EPIL represents certain empowerment and potentially improves the rule of 
law. 96  The findings and analysis above demonstrate that NGOs have played an 
invaluable role in improving environmental performance in China, though it is 
 
94 Xisheng Huang and Hongzheng Wang, ‘海洋公益诉讼：识别、困境与进路<Maritime Environmental Public 
Interest Litigation>’ (2020) 28 Chinese Journal of Maritime Law 28-35. 
95 中国水产科学研究院东海水产研究所 v 普罗旺斯船东 2008-1 有限公司, (2015)甬海法事初字第 36 号, 宁
波海事法院 (25 June 2019). 
96 Erin Ryan, ‘The Elaborate Paper Tiger: Environmental Enforcement and the Rule of Law in China’ (2013) 24 
Duke Environmental Law and Policy Forum 183–239; Martin Kwan, ‘China’s rule of law development: the 
increasing emphasis on internationalization of legal standards and the horizontal rule of law’ (2021) 53 Journal of 
International Law and Politics 51-62. 
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important to recognize that the continued commitment and further development of 
NGO EPIL require sustainable financial and other support. 
6.3 Realignment of EPIL practice and framework 
EPIL is a new and dynamic area for Chinese law where the main actors are finding 
their own approach and areas of comfort. The relative success in some aspects and the 
lack of progress in others could well lead to the rethinking of the applicable framework. 
Some have even called for abolishing civil EPIL by NGOs.97 While that is certainly a 
minority view in the overall pro-environment sentiment in China currently, more 
specific issues or difficulties should lead to realignment of particular rules and practices 
in EPIL.  
Given the efficiency of the procuratorate and the reluctance of NGOs to get involved 
in low-value cases, for example, it seems appropriate for law reforms or reinterpretation 
of policies to allow the procuratorate proceeding with certain types or categories of civil 
EPIL without the public announcement stage. The procuratorate have clearly 
established themselves as the cornerstone of EPIL. It is right that this is recognized in 
the law, at least in certain contexts such as low-value routine cases against waste 
dumping or poaching, instead of some artificial narrative that they only play a backup 
role where NGOs or the government do not act. Meanwhile, pleas for more 
advantageous policies may hold less persuasion if not backed up by good performance. 
It will not be surprising if calls for another ‘public announcement’ process to be 
introduced for the sole benefit of NGOs before the government take any EEDC action 
 
97 Xi Wang, ‘关于优化我国环境公益诉讼制度的建议 <Suggestions for optimizing the system of environmental 
public interest litigation>’, 28 Jan. 2021, available at https://www.sohu.com/a/447325506_100001695.  
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are to fall on deaf ears, 98  given that NGOs hardly ever respond to similar 
announcement by the procuratorate. 
The priority for policy makers and local government should instead be the 
formalization of EEDC policies into legislation, so that there will be clear and 
consistent rules in place across different provinces and administrative levels as to 
EEDC practice. The status quo where a government department could win an EEDC 
claim at first instance, only to be told that they had no standing to sue on appeal, wasting 
time and resources of everyone,99 is plainly doing a disservice to the integrity of both 
environmental governance and the legal system more generally. 
7. Conclusion 
Through undertaking extensive examination of hundreds of court judgments, this study 
seeks to take the understanding of EPIL in China beyond the level of theoretical critique. 
While it is expected that a new system such as EPIL will encounter difficulties, 
especially within the legal system of China which has been under heavy scrutiny given 
its differences from many Western systems, the examination of actual cases provides 
far more insight than stereotypical depiction of how the government, the procuratorate 
or NGOs work in China. 
This study shows that the procuratorate has established itself as the core of EPIL 
practice on multiple grounds, including the far greater number of cases, the scope of 
 
98 ‘新环保法实施六年 环境公益诉讼实现对重点地区全覆盖 <Six years since commencement of the new 
Environmental Protection Law, environmental public interest litigation comprehensively covers all key areas>’, 
Legal Daily (8 Jan. 2021), available at https://www.chinanews.com/gn/2021/01-08/9381551.shtml, citing the 
suggestion of a deputy director of the legal department of a major environmental NGO.  
99 黄强勇 v 龙海市水利局, (2018) 闽 06 民终 1109 号, 福建省漳州市中级人民法院 (21 June 2018). 
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their operations covering cases of varying significance, the positive outcome in almost 
all cases, and the efficiency and professionalism in general. The main concern or 
criticism that could be had seems to be that the procuratorate are too competent in what 
they are familiar with to venture into anything atypical or unusual. They would be 
happier to undertake many cases of waste dumping or forest logging with well tried and 
tested methodology, than taking cases such as air pollution or damage to the maritime 
environment which have few established approaches. 
NGOs on the other hand are adventurous and willing to take on these challenges. 
They meet obstacles occasionally but are in general not easily deterred in pursuing what 
they see as important to environmental protection. Nevertheless, the sense of rapport 
between the procuratorate and NGOs in collaborative EPIL actions in the first couple 
of years after 2014 seem to have dissipated, largely due to NGOs’ choice or preference 
to go for the high-value cases instead of the mundane cases that the procuratorate 
continue to be focusing on. Higher value litigation seems to demand higher costs on 
NGOs, high lawyers’ fees in particular, which the court in many parts of the country is 
not prepared to fully endorse. 
In abandoning the low-value operations, NGOs effectively moved into competition 
with the government and their EEDC lawsuits. Currently the government do not get 
much better results than NGOs in the court, either in terms of outcomes or 
reimbursement of costs. Nevertheless, governmental EEDC lawsuits explicitly enjoy 
procedural priority over NGO EPIL under current policy. Much of the difficulty for 
local government in EEDC is self-inflicted, such as the lack of proper authorization by 
the provincial government. When the EEDC system is fully established, most likely in 
laws rather than policy documents, it is foreseeable that the government could be more 
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efficient and active in pursuing EEDC. This in turn could exert considerable pressure 
on NGOs in EPIL. 
A reasonable re-alignment of the EPIL system based on such findings could be the 
authorization of the procuratorate to undertake civil EPIL without first waiting for 
NGOs in some contexts, such as the low-value, well established areas. Meanwhile, 
more substantive adjustments may be needed for NGOs if they want to further develop 
their role in EPIL. Instead of focusing on what they are not currently permitted to do 
under current law, such as administrative EPIL or maritime lawsuit, it may be more 
practical and helpful to start on what they can do, including the low-value cases. This 
potentially builds not only the expertise within NGOs but also the professional help 
they could call on such as lawyers and scientists. NGOs should play to their strengths 
in terms of drawing broad support for the important cause of environmental protection, 
with a view to establish more favourable modes of partnership that does not always 
involve high levels of lawyers’ fees that the court have frequently criticized. NGOs have 
played an important role so far in EPIL in China. It would be immensely helpful if they 
can learn from these successes as well as obstacles to continually develop their practice 
and conception of EPIL suitable to the Chinese system, so that they remain an important 
partner to both the procuratorate and the government in the future of EPIL and 
environmental governance of China. 
